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1 OVERVIEW
As from the second half of 2013, a scenario of incipient recovery progressively firmed in 
the Spanish economy, continuing into the opening months of 2014. Quarter-on-quarter 
GDP growth rates turned positive, though moderate, and modest job creation ensued. 
Both external and domestic factors came into play here. The economic policy decisions 
adopted by the euro area governments, progress in euro area governance and the ECB’s 
expansionary monetary policy have contributed to relaxing financial tensions, although 
they still remain high, and to sustaining the fragile recovery in the European economy. In 
turn, internally, significant headway has been made in restructuring the banking system 
and in correcting, to varying degrees, fiscal and competitiveness-based imbalances, 
among others. Joint action on these fronts has led to an easing of the adverse financing 
conditions and a pick-up in the confidence of both international investors and domestic 
households and firms, which have enabled the Spanish economy to overcome the extreme 
tensions of 2012 and exit the second recession of the crisis. 
The characteristics and depth of the crisis pose numerous challenges in terms of 
entrenching the recovery and setting a new sustained growth path. Uncertainty and 
risks are still high, and GDP and employment levels remain far below those reached 
prior to the crisis. To meet these challenges satisfactorily, there must be further 
economic policy measures at the European level aimed at bolstering still-weak growth 
and further progress with the roadmap for attaining a genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union, and most particularly a banking union. At the same time, in terms of domestic 
economic policy, momentum in correcting imbalances and in pushing through the 
reform agenda must be maintained. The complex situation of the Spanish economy, 
according to the analysis contained in this report, highlights the importance of furthering 
structural measures that anchor the capacity for growth in the long run, enhance 
competitiveness and help achieve the budgetary stability targets needed to restore the 
sustainability of public finances. Only thus may domestic and external confidence be 
durably restored and headway made in progressively reducing the high levels of debt 
weighing down on agents’ spending decisions, a matter to which Chapter 2 of this 
Report is dedicated. 
Following a lacklustre first half of the year, global economic activity rose in the second half 
of 2013. As a result the year ended with an increase in global GDP of 3% and international 
trade on a rising trend. The recovery was essentially underpinned by the performance of 
the advanced economies, most particularly the United States, since the block comprising 
the emerging and developing economies saw some loss of momentum (see Chart 1.1). 
The changes in monetary policy implemented by the Federal Reserve in response to the 
behaviour of the US economy and the course of some of the imbalances that have built up 
in the emerging economies are prompting an increase in uncertainty and in the risks linked 
to the future performance of these latter countries. 
Inflation rates have broadly remained moderate, especially in the advanced economies, 
where activity continues to be below potential and monetary policies have adopted a 
strongly expansionary stance. 
The economic indicators that have emerged to date in 2014 and forecasts by analysts and 
international organisations generally point to the main trends observed in the final stretch 
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In the second half of 2013 
there was an incipient 
recovery in the Spanish 
economy underpinned by both 
external and domestic factors
But considerable challenges 
remain, meaning that the 
firming of the recovery 
requires perseverance with the 
measures that have prompted 
the turnaround 
2  The external boost to 
the recovery of the 
Spanish economy 
Global economic activity rose 
in the second half of 2013 and 
of tensions shifted towards the 
emerging economies 
Inflation rates are, in general, 
moderate 
These same trends have run 
into early 2014 
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of last year continuing: a progressive recovery in the global economy, a greater re-balancing 
of the respective contributions of the advanced and of the emerging and developing 
economies, a shift in the main focus of uncertainty and of risks from the former to the latter, 
and the absence of inflationary risks. 
The euro area also participated in the recovery in global activity and, from 2013 Q2, posted 
positive quarter-on-quarter growth rates. On the whole, however, the year saw a 0.4 pp 
fall-off in output. The greater buoyancy of international trade boosted external demand, 
while the progressive shift in focus in respect of tensions towards the emerging economies 
provided some relief to European financial markets, which had a favourable bearing on the 
area’s internal demand. 
But the growing dynamism of the euro area was also underpinned by the economic policy 
decisions adopted domestically. On one hand, on the domestic stage, Member State 
governments continue to push through fiscal consolidation and structural reform, in 
accordance with the recommendations drawn up by the European Commission under the 
European Semester. The financial support programmes (for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Cyprus) saw significant progress made, especially in the cases of Ireland, whose 
programme concluded in December, and Portugal, where it did so in May. The partial 
programme of financial assistance for the recapitalisation of the Spanish banking system 
also concluded in early 2014. Together, this has given an additional boost to domestic and 
external confidence in the soundness of the European project. 
As regards the governance of the area, the European Commission revised in summer 2013 
the various Member States’ budget deficit objectives in order to align them to a greater 
extent to the economies’ cyclical positions and thus promote fiscal consolidation paths 
that are not an obstacle to growth. 
Significant headway has also been made throughout 2013 and in 2014 to date in the 
ongoing creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Its design is practically 
complete and it will commence operating fully late in 2014. This centralisation of banking 
supervision enables the authorities to sidestep the problem of economic governance 
posed by the coexistence – in an economy as heavily banked as the euro area – of a single 
Euro area GDP posted positive 
growth rates from Q2, boosted 
by a more favourable external 
environment…
… by the economic policy 
decisions adopted by the 
Member States’ governments, 
both domestically…
… and as part of the 
governance of the area as  
a whole, …
SOURCE: IMF (WEO April 2014).
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monetary policy and currency in a setting of free capital movements, on one hand, and a 
micro-prudential supervision policy that is still fragmented at the level of the Member 
States, on the other. 
Progress has also been made regarding the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), the 
other key element of the banking union project. In this case, however, aspects of great 
importance have still to be specified, including most notably the design of financial 
backstops. Banking union marks a milestone on the road to a genuine economic and 
monetary union, and getting its final design right will determine whether the links between 
banking and sovereign risk, which continue to pose a major obstacle to overcoming 
financial market fragmentation in the area and, consequently, to anchoring economic 
recovery, can be conclusively broken. 
Greater economic buoyancy in the euro area also has the strongly accommodating 
monetary policy applied by the ECB since the onset of the crisis to thank. This course of 
action was deepened in 2013. On the conventional front, two new cuts in official interest 
rates were made, placing the rate on the main refinancing operations at an all-time low of 
0.25%, and the rate on the deposit facility at 0%. Regarding unconventional measures, in 
addition to retaining abundant long-term liquidity provision, an active policy of forward 
guidance was pursued from the summer. Most specifically, the ECB’s Governing Council 
has conveyed to the public its expectations that interest rates will hold at or below their 
current level over a prolonged period. 
Monetary policy decisions have been taken in a complex setting in which inflation, after 
standing at 2% in January 2013, moved on a clearly declining trajectory over the year 
to settle below 1% both in the final stretch of the year and in early 2014. In conjunction 
with the forecasts by the ECB and by other analysts, these data shape a scenario in 
which the growth of prices might fall some distance below the threshold of 2% over a 
relatively prolonged period. Admittedly, long-term inflation expectations remain 
anchored at levels compatible with the price stability objective set, against a background 
of ample slack in the euro area economy; but the persistence of low inflation rates over 
a lengthy period of time increases the risk that expectations may be unanchored, posing 
a threat to the sustainability of the recovery and an added obstacle to the necessary 
absorption of the internal imbalances affecting the euro area (see Box 1.1). Accordingly, 
the ECB continues to maintain a high degree of monetary accommodation and has 
reiterated its readiness to take further measures, conventional and unconventional 
alike, if necessary. 
In June, after the cut-off date for this Annual Report, the ECB adopted an extensive 
package of measures. These included fresh cuts to its key interest rates; targeted long-
term refinancing operations geared to promoting credit; the extension of fixed rate full 
allotment tender procedures at least until December 2016; the suspension of the fine-
tuning operation sterilising the purchases under the Securities Market Programme, and 
the intensification of the preparatory work relating to outright purchases in the asset-
backed securities market.
The main indicators show an evident lowering of the degree of tension of the area’s 
financial conditions in the area. Risk premia, volatilities and credit ratings have 
generally improved significantly during 2013 and in 2014 to date (see Chart 1.2). 
Resilience in the face of political or geo-strategic shocks has also been greater than in 
previous phases. However, restoring normality is proving slow, is far from complete 
… and by the ECB’s 
expansionary monetary policy, 
in a setting in which inflation 
stands below and some way 
off its reference level of 2% 
Financial conditions in the 
euro area have clearly 
improved, although it is not 
yet possible to talk about 
normality
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BOX 1.1THE RECENT MODERATION IN INFLATION: OUTLOOK AND RISKS
Inflation slowed markedly in 2013 both in Spain and in the euro 
area as a whole, with the respective year-on-year changes in the 
HICP in December standing at 0.3% and 0.8%. This trajectory has 
continued in 2014 to date. Projections by private analysts, official 
agencies and those implicit in financial market prices assume 
inflation will hold at very low levels for a prolonged period (see 
accompanying table 1). Specifically, for the euro area as a whole, 
the projections available point to a very slow return to rates close 
to 2% and to a negative Spain/euro area differential. However, 
longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored at levels 
slightly below the 2% reference (see Panel 1). 
The recent downward course of inflation is due to the 
disappearance of certain temporary factors, linked to fiscal 
consolidation, and to the trend of energy prices and the exchange 
rate, although factors of a more permanent nature are also in play. 
The latter include most notably the moderation of unit labour costs 
and significant excess slack. The influence of these factors has 
been greater in Spain than in the euro area as a whole, owing to 
the adjustment under way here to regain the competitiveness lost 
during the expansionary phase.
Against this background of very low inflation, analysis of the 
scenarios in which price declines and, ultimately, deflationary 
processes – with across-the-board and sustained falls in prices – 
might arise has become important. In this respect, the diffusion 
indicators show that price declines are not overly widespread either 
in Spain or the euro area (see Panel 2)1, though they have increased 
in 2013, albeit without yet reaching the highs observed in late 2009 
and early 2010. Unlike that period, however, the recent slowdown in 
prices is proving especially significant in the case of services prices 
which, as they are particularly labour-intensive, have been more 
affected by wage moderation and productivity gains. 
In any event, when evaluating scenarios of sustained price 
declines a distinction must be drawn between the consequences 
for the euro area as a whole and for Spain. A fall in a euro area 
member country’s prices might reflect the adjustment of relative 
prices needed to correct some of its imbalances. In that respect, 
Spain 2014 2015 2016
    Consensus Forecast (April 2014) 0.3 1.0 1.5
    European Commission (February 2014) 0.3 0.9 —
    IMF (April 2014) 0.3 0.8 0.9
Euro Area
    ECB (March 2014) 1.0 1.3 1.5
    Consensus Forecast (April 2014) 0.9 1.3 1.5
    European Commission (February 2014) 1.0 1.3 —
    IMF (April 2014) 0.9 1.2 1.3
    Inflation swap contracts (24 April 2014) 1.0 1.2 1.4
1  INFLATION FORECASTS 
SOURCES: Eurostat.
a Obtained from inflation swap contracts. 
b Consensus Forecast forecasts from the third year onwards are only updated in April and October each year.
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shocks originating in positive developments on the supply side 
entail benign price declines, as they are accompanied by higher 
levels of output and employment. Notable among these are 
those linked to structural reforms that improve the economy’s 
productivity or heighten competition in product and factor 
markets.2 Conversely, contractionary demand-side shocks may 
be more harmful, bringing together declines in prices and output 
which, if they feed back into one another, may prompt a 
deflationary spiral. 
A generalised and persistent situation of price declines may 
dampen activity through various channels. Firstly, expectations of 
sustained low inflation exerts upward pressure on the expected 
real interest rate, which leads to private spending being deferred. 
Moreover, if – as is currently the case – nominal interest rates are 
close to zero, the capacity of conventional monetary policy to 
correct this effect is very limited. Secondly, as debt contacts are 
specified in nominal terms, falls in prices increase the real-terms 
cost of servicing such debt. That is particularly significant in 
countries such as Spain, where the volume of household and 
corporate debt is still high. Lastly, and more generally, very low 
inflation across the euro area hampers an individual country 
achieving gains in competitiveness relative to the area as a whole.
In any event, a very moderate inflation scenario may trigger particularly 
adverse effects if it unanchors long-term inflation expectations, 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy and increasing 
real interest rates. Nonetheless, at present European households do 
not seem to expect either that consumer prices will fall (see Panel 3) 
or that long-term inflation expectations will be far off 2%. 
The Banco de España dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model BEMOD, estimated for Spain and the rest of the euro area, 
provides for the analysis of the probability of different price 
scenarios materialising in relation to Eurosystem predictions. In 
particular, an assessment can be made of the probability with 
which moderate inflation (lower than 1% on average in 2014) or 
price falls of some intensity (a rate of change below -1%) might be 
observed.3 The estimations show that scenarios of inflation below 
1% are highly likely, especially in Spain, while the scenarios of price 
declines of over 1% are fairly unlikely. In addition, to assess the 
extent to which a slightly higher level of inflation across the euro 
area may smooth the competitive adjustment needed in Spain, an 
alternative exercise has been conducted. In it, as the result of a 
more expansionary monetary policy, inflation in the euro area 
increases by 50 bp in 2014 and 2015, drawing closer to the 2% 
target in late 2015. Under this new scenario, there is an appreciably 
lower probability that Spanish inflation will be below -1%.
In short, the evidence available would indicate that inflation is 
going to remain at very low levels over a prolonged period, but that 
the probability of a costly deflation process arising at present is 
limited. In any event, the adjustment still required in terms of 
competitiveness in some economies in the area, such as Spain’s, 
would be assisted if the euro area inflation rate were to converge 
towards its long-term target at a somewhat brisker rate pace than 
is currently anticipated. 
BOX 1.1THE RECENT MODERATION IN INFLATION: OUTLOOK AND RISKS (cont’d)
2  See J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and C. Thomas (2014), Structural reforms in a 
debt overhang, Documento de Trabajo del Banco de España 
(forthcoming), and Box 1.2 in this Chapter.
3  In interpreting the results it should be borne in mind that the simulations 
performed incorporate the zero lower bound constraint whereby nominal 
interest rates cannot be negative, although they do not consider the 
possibility of implementing non-conventional monetary policy measures. 
In addition, the exercises presented hereafter do not take into account 
the debt deflation channel, meaning that the total cost of the generalised 
and sustained declines in prices might be being underestimated. Lastly, 
bootstrapping techniques are used to take into account the dependence 
of the structural shocks.
SOURCES: Banco de España and European Commission.
a Calculated with seasonally adjusted series.
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and remains exposed to the risk of further shocks. Adverse developments in credit, 
and in particular lending extended to firms, affects not only the economies most 
severely punished by the crisis but also the euro area as a whole, further hampering 
the process of economic recovery. Moreover, the persisting differences in financing 
costs across the various Member States still reflect a degree of financial market 
fragmentation that is not compatible with the normal functioning of a monetary union 
and which prevents expansionary monetary impulses effectively reaching the areas 
where they are most needed. 
The Spanish economy embarked on a gradual recovery in 2013 and, in Q3, it exited the 
recession that had begun two years earlier, posting modest increases in GDP (see Chart 
1.3). This change in trajectory, which has continued into the opening months of 2014, was 
helped also by the easing in financial tensions and by a gradual improvement in perceptions 
about the labour market situation, which contributed to lessening uncertainty and 
increasing confidence. Adding to this was the greater gradualism in the budgetary 
adjustment policy, following the European Council’s July decision to put back two years 
the date for placing the budget deficit below 3% of GDP. That entailed a relaxing of the 
deficit target by 2 pp mid-year, from 4.5% of GDP to 6.5% of GDP. 
Despite moving on an improving course over the year, GDP fell by 1.2% in 2013, partly as 
a result of the carry-over effect arising from the marked decline in activity in late 2012. 
3  Adjustment and 
recovery in the Spanish 
economy 
The improvement in the 
external environment and the 
abatement of financial instability 
were conducive to the recovery 
in the Spanish economy in the 
second half of 2013
SOURCES: ECB, JP Morgan and ESRB.
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 FINANCIAL 
 NON-FINANCIAL 
BBB CORPORATE BONDS. SWAPS ASSETS SPREAD 
  bp 
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1,000 
1,200 
1,400 
1,600 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 FRANCE  ITALY  SPAIN 
 PORTUGAL  IRELAND 
10-YEAR SOVEREIGN SPREAD OVER GERMANY 
bp 
EURO AREA FINANCIAL CONDITIONS CHART 1.2 
9 
14 
19 
24 
29 
34 
39 
44 
49 
1,800 
2,000 
2,200 
2,400 
2,600 
2,800 
3,000 
3,200 
3,400 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 EUROSTOXX 50  IMPLIED VOLATILITY (right-hand scale) 
STOCK MARKET 
  
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
COMPOSITE INDICATOR OF SYSTEMIC STRESS (CISS) 
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 ANNUAL REPORT, 2013 1. OVERVIEW
From the expenditure standpoint, national demand fell by 2.7% while the external sector 
made a positive contribution of 1.5 pp, thereby mitigating, for the sixth consecutive year, 
the impact of the contraction in domestic spending on activity (see Chart 1.4). 
The pace of the contraction in national demand also lessened over the course of the year. 
Among the private components of domestic spending, investment in equipment began to pick 
up earlier, right at the start of the year, followed by household consumption as from Q2. In turn, 
residential investment posted negative figures throughout the year, albeit at an increasingly 
diminished pace, which took its rate of annual decline to 8%, and its percentage expressed in 
terms of GDP to 4.4%, 65% down on its 2006 peak. Finally, the negative contribution of the 
public components of expenditure (government consumption and public investment) to 
activity lessened against the background of the easing in fiscal requirements mid-year. 
The improvement in business investment was confined to the capital goods component, 
which increased by a moderate 2.2%, assisted by the greater momentum of exports, the 
reduction in uncertainty, the incipient alleviation of adverse financing conditions and, lastly, 
the further restructuring of non-financial corporations’ financial positions, whose net 
lending capacity rose to 4.3% of GDP in 2013. The internal resources generated by the 
surplus in saving relative to investment are helping correct the excessive debt that prevailed 
in recent years. 
The rebalancing of external 
and national demand was 
underpinned by the recovery 
in investment in equipment 
and in household consumption 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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Household consumption picked up in the second half of 2013, although for the year on 
average it posted a fall of 2.5% following two years of declines, having worsened to a 
particularly acute extent in the final stretch of 2012. The recovery in consumption over the 
course of the year came about against the background of the slowing decline in disposable 
income, which was more marked in real terms owing to the moderate inflation in 2013, and 
the more favourable trend of households’ financial wealth. The pronounced declining 
trajectory of the saving rate from 2009 was interrupted, and it posted a level similar to that 
of the previous year (10.4% of disposable income) and similar, too, to its historical average. 
The positive contribution of net external demand to GDP amounted to 1.5 pp. This was the 
result of buoyant exports, as imports stabilised owing to the improvement in final demand after 
having declined heavily in 2012. Export growth was driven both by goods sales to the rest of the 
world, which expanded more than their target markets did, and by exports of tourist services, 
in an exceptional year for the sector in which tourist revenues were at an all-time high. Gains in 
competitiveness played a very significant role in both developments, as is discussed below. 
That said, the contribution of the external sector was smaller than that of the two previous 
years, and it moved on a declining trajectory as exports progressively slowed, following 
the weakening of the emerging economies, and as imports from the rest of the world rose, 
in step with the pick-up in the components of final demand with a greater import content 
(exports and investment in equipment). 
The sequence of the recovery in the different components of expenditure – first exports, next 
business investment and lastly household consumption – provides a good starting point for 
anchoring the recovery. However, entrenching the recovery requires certain conditions be met 
so that household and business spending may grow in a sustained manner, and in the current 
circumstances that depends essentially on the dynamism of employment. 
The rate of decline in employment eased in 2013 to 3.4% (4.8% the previous year), this 
rate being much influenced in any event by the adverse behaviour of employment in the 
final stretch of 2012. Indeed, the pace of job destruction gradually eased as the year 
unfolded, to the point of showing marginal job creation in the closing months of the year, 
for the first time since 2008 Q2. This progressive improvement was fairly generalised 
Net external demand 
contributed once again to 
lessening the contractionary 
impact of domestic demand 
on output, although it moved 
on a declining trajectory 
The rate of decline in 
employment lessened during 
the year, until turning marginally 
positive in the final months, for 
the first time since 2008 Q2...
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Quarterly National Accounts full-time equivalents.
b The EPA (Spanish Labour Force Survey) series follow 2005 methodology and are updated with the 2011 census.
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across the sectors of activity, although it was more marked in certain market services, and 
has continued in 2014 to date. 
The unemployment rate moved on to a declining trajectory in Q1, from a level of 26.9% of 
the labour force (a figure encompassing somewhat more than 6 million unemployed) to 
25.9% in the opening months of 2014. These developments in unemployment were 
assisted by the contraction of the labour supply, which fell by 1.1% (after stabilising the 
previous year) owing to the decline in the working-age population and to a slight reduction 
in the participation rate, for the first time since the start of the crisis. The decline in the 
labour force was more acute among foreign nationals (-5.5%), although it also affected 
nationals for the first time (–0.6 %) (see Chart 1.5).
However, at the close of the year, the composition of unemployment in terms of age and 
skills groups had scarcely altered, meaning that the highest unemployment rates were 
among the less-skilled youths. In turn, the slight rise in unemployment exit flows in the 
second half of 2013 was concentrated among those unemployed for less than a year, 
whereby the incidence of long-term unemployment moved on a rising trajectory throughout 
the year, reaching a rate of 61.6% in Q1 this year. The level of unemployment, its composition 
and its persistence are indicative of the considerable scale of the problem to be resolved. 
The scenario of recovery that has finally taken shape over the past year, after overcoming the 
sharp double-dip recession, is closely linked to progress in the correction of the imbalances 
that place the Spanish economy in a position of extreme vulnerability to the international crisis 
and, particularly, to the euro area sovereign debt crisis. From this starting point, the sustainability 
of demand and the firming of the recovery depend on job creation gaining in strength and on 
completing the adjustments still pending in respect of the remaining imbalances. 
Fiscal consolidation continued in 2013, with an initial overall general government deficit target 
of 4.5% of GDP, entailing a reduction of 2.3 pp on that of the previous year (6.8% of GDP, once 
the assistance to financial institutions is stripped out). Mid-year, however, the European 
Council agreed to better tailor deficit targets to the weakness of the cyclical position, providing 
for greater gradualism in implementing the policy of budgetary adjustment. In Spain, this 
decision meant a relaxing of the deficit target for 2013, which was set at 6.5% of GDP. For the 
2014-2016 period, the new targets were set at 5.8%, 4.2% and 2.8% of GDP, respectively. 
... and the unemployment rate 
began to turn down as from 
Q1, ending the year at 25.7%. 
The level of unemployment, its 
composition and its persistence 
indicate that a far-reaching 
adjustment must be made 
For the recovery to firm 
requires that the correction  
of the imbalances still in place 
be completed 
3.1  FISCAL CONSOLIDATION 
The intensity of the budgetary 
adjustment eased mid-year 
following the European 
authorities’ decision to tailor 
deficit targets more to cyclical 
circumstances 
SOURCES: IGAE and European Commission (AMECO).
a European Commission estimate (AMECO, spring 2014).
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The updated Stability Programme submitted by the Government to the European Commission 
on 30 April confirmed these targets, though it considered a somewhat more ambitious 
reduction in the general government deficit in 2014, setting it at 5.5% of GDP. 
The year 2013 was the first full one in which the mechanisms of the Law on Budgetary 
Stability and Financial Sustainability for the monitoring of the budget outturn, and those 
geared to ensuring compliance with the targets set for all tiers of government, began to be 
applied. Furthermore, an extension was made in 2013 to the payments to suppliers plan, 
which ended in February 2014, and which injected somewhat over €43 billion from mid-
2012. Lastly, the close of the year saw the completion of the framework of national fiscal 
rules, with the creation of the Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility.
In step with these conditioning factors, the fiscal adjustment drive continued in 2013 
through a reduction in the primary structural balance of the order of 1.6% of GDP, which 
was less intense than in previous years (3 pp in 2012). Reducing the deficit was once again 
hampered by cyclical weakness and by the growing weight of interest payments (which 
climbed to 3.4% of GDP), as a result of which net general government borrowing shrank 
to 6.6% of GDP (a figure net of the assistance to financial institutions), 0.1 pp higher than 
the target set in July (see Chart 1.6). 
In terms of sub-sectors, the reduction in the budget deficit reflected the adjustment by the 
regional and local governments (by 0.3 and 0.2 pp of GDP, to balances totalling -1.5% and 
0.4% of GDP, respectively), with a higher surplus in the latter case than that programmed 
when the targets were set. In turn, the aggregate central government and Social Security 
System target deficit was exceeded by 0.3 pp of GDP, standing at the close of the year at 
5.5% of GDP. As regards components, the slight reduction in net general government 
borrowing came about chiefly as a result of the increase in indirect tax revenue following the 
hike in VAT the previous year and the introduction of other, environment-related taxes, although 
their impact was less than initially foreseen. By contrast, no headway was made in reducing 
public spending since the increase in interest payments and in welfare benefits could not be 
offset by the adjustment of certain government consumption and capital expenditure items. 
In turn, the public debt ratio rose significantly, from 85.9% of GDP in 2012 to 93.9% last year. 
Market economy unit labour costs (ULCs) declined by 2.2% in annual average terms, the 
result of the stabilisation of compensation per employee in the market economy and an 
increase in productivity lower than that of the previous year (see Chart 1.7). The decline in 
economy-wide ULCs was somewhat lower (-1.6%) owing to the base effect that prompted 
the fall in public-sector wages in December 2012. Overall, these developments entailed the 
closing of the gap that opened up between the respective Spanish and euro area rates of 
change of labour costs during the expansionary phase, which had resulted in heavy losses in 
competitiveness. Unlike in the early years of the crisis, in 2013, as had occurred the previous 
year, the correction of ULCs turned more on the adjustment of labour costs than on productivity 
gains, since the latter gradually fell away in step with the diminishing pace of job destruction. 
In 2013, labour costs intensified the path of wage moderation that had progressively 
become discernible in 2012, possibly reflecting the greater sensitivity over the setting of 
wages to the specific situation of firms in response to the broader possibilities for internal 
flexibility generated by the entry into force of the labour reform. Under collective bargaining, 
fewer wage settlements and a reduction in the number of agreements including indexation 
clauses and in their amount were observed, while wage drift (the difference between wage 
increases in collective agreements, adjusted where appropriate for indexation clauses, 
Acting as a reference point  
for budgetary conduct were the 
commitments to reporting and 
monitoring emanating from the 
current framework of fiscal rules
The general government 
deficit shrank to 6.6% in a 
complex macroeconomic 
setting, marked by cyclical 
weakness and by the rise in 
interest payments 
3.2  RECOVERY IN 
COMPETITIVENESS 
There was fresh momentum  
to the recovery in 
competitiveness in 2013  
as a result of the easing in 
labour costs and in prices 
Labour costs reflected the 
pattern of greater wage 
moderation, derived in part 
from the increase in domestic 
flexibility provided by the new 
labour market framework 
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and the rate of change of compensation per employee) turned negative once more. This 
latter variable may be viewed as an indirect indicator of the effect of other aspects of the 
labour reform, in which exact information is not available (cases in point may be the 
effective use of the possibilities of opt-outs or the amendment of working conditions). As 
a result, average real wages fell slightly. 
The inflation rate fell markedly during the year, as the base effects of the rise in certain 
administered prices and the hike in VAT in September 2012 were progressively removed. 
Stripping out these effects, a situation of practical stagnation in the overall level of prices 
prevailed throughout the year, and has continued in 2014 to date. 
This change in price dynamics reflects an increase in the sensitivity of price-setting to 
cyclical conditions and is particularly significant in the case of services, where the 
slowdown in prices is proving more pronounced, after having been the central point of 
inflationary tensions in the past. This appears to confirm a greater alignment of sale prices 
to costs borne and to the specific conditions of the business cycle. 
The high degree of financial tension in recent years would appear to have bolstered the 
pick-up in margins at this phase of the cycle by inducing certain companies to alleviate 
the effects arising from tight credit standards by generating funds within the business 
And inflation held at a very low 
level, as the effects of the rises 
in administered prices and in 
indirect taxes in 2012 were 
progressively stripped out 
There has been an increase in 
the sensitivity of cost- and 
price-setting to the cyclical 
position...
... and the recovery in 
business margins has 
continued 
SOURCE: Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rates with sign changed.
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The widening of margins would have been assisted by the prevalence of an insufficient 
degree of competition in certain sectors. In any event, the generation of funds within 
businesses should be conducive to the incipient investor cycle gaining momentum.
Overall, in recent years there has been a noticeable reduction in the Spain-euro area 
inflation differential, which has narrowed from 1 pp on average in the 1998-2007 period to 
0.2 pp in the downturn. The narrowing of this gap has been of a similar intensity in terms 
of core inflation. Since September last year, Spanish inflation has stood systematically 
below that of the euro area (with an average differential of -0.6 pp), ensuring the continuity 
of the adjustment of relative prices even under the difficult conditions created by low 
European inflation (see Box 1.1). 
The recovery in competitiveness had a positive impact on foreign trade, whereby in 2013 
a current account surplus was posted for the first time since 1997 (0.8% of GDP compared 
with a deficit of -1.2% of GDP in 2012). This result was in response to an improvement in 
virtually all the current account components, although most notably so, as has been the 
case since 2007, in the non-energy trade balance, which marks a most significant advance 
in the necessary process of external rebalancing (see Chart 1.8). That said, the high 
dependence on imported energy continues to exert an adverse influence on the external 
balance. In terms of difficulties, mention should also be made of the persistent deficit on 
the income balance, linked to the high level of the International Investment Position (IIP). 
To attain lasting external equilibrium it is thus necessary for the surplus on the trade in 
non-energy goods and in services to offset the deficits on the imported energy and income 
balances. 
Chapter 2 of this Report analyses in detail the implications of the increase in the Spanish 
economy’s debt prior to the crisis, which in a heavily banked system such as Spain’s took 
the form of an expansion in credit institutions’ balance sheets and likewise translated into 
a high concentration of risks in productive activities linked to the real estate market. Both 
factors (balance sheet expansion and risk concentration) placed banks in a position of 
vulnerability to adverse macroeconomic shocks, and in particular to those that might 
affect the real estate market to a greater extent. The incidence of the crisis on the banking 
system’s financial and wealth position was very mixed from bank to bank. 
Overall, the prices differential 
has turned favourable for the 
Spanish economy 
The ongoing internal 
devaluation is exerting a very 
favourable effect on the 
Spanish economy’s terms  
of trade 
3.3  THE RESTRUCTURING AND 
CLEAN-UP OF THE 
BANKING SYSTEM
The crisis severely impacted a 
sector that was oversized and 
highly exposed to real estate 
activity…
SOURCES: INE, Customs and Banco de España.
a The energy and non-energy balance are a Banco de España estimate drawing on Customs data.
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To face up to the effects of the crisis, a far-reaching reform of the banking system was 
undertaken. The reform has progressively adjusted to ensuing events and has been 
structured around four major courses of action: the restructuring of the system, its 
recapitalisation, the clean-up of balance sheets and the reform of the regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks. 
Some of these measures required the release of a sizeable volume of public funds at a 
time at which financial tensions and the subsequent degree of market fragmentation 
meant they could not be obtained at reasonable prices on the markets; accordingly, the 
Span ish Government formally requested financial assistance in the summer of 2012, 
which was granted through a sectoral European programme for the recapitalisation of 
part of the banking system. The programme envisaged the drawdown of a maximum 
amount of €100 billion, although only €41 billion were used, and it was formalised with the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that detailed the main measures that 
have shaped the reform process since. 
The authorities’ positive assessment of the fulfilment of the conditions of the MoU meant 
that the programme could be considered as concluded in early 2014. The culmination of 
this stage marks the completion of a process that has deeply transformed the Spanish 
banking system. 
Compared with the situation in 2007, the number of credit institutions has fallen by 17%; 
that of their offices, by 22%; and that of employees in the sector, by 15%. These 
adjustments, which under the timetables envisaged for certain banks’ restructuring plans 
will be pursued further, have been particularly centred on the savings banks, which were 
much affected by the crisis and saw their capacity to respond greatly limited by their 
particular legal status. As a result, savings banks had to transfer their financial intermediation 
activity to banking institutions. The net exposure of the system as a whole to the real 
estate sector was more than halved, further to a substantial increase in provisions required 
(Royal Decree-Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012 entailed an increase in provisions equivalent to 
approximately one-fifth of prior net exposure) and, in the case of institutions that receive 
public aid to recapitalise, through the transfer of claims on real estate developers and 
foreclosures to a new and mostly privately held institution created to this end under the 
framework of the MoU: Sareb.
Banks’ effort in terms of recapitalisation was also significant. In 2012 a stress test 
was performed by an independent external consultancy to estimate the funds needed 
to reinforce the capital of each individual institution. 17 groups of institutions 
participated, representing 90% of the system’s total loans, and at ten of them (with a 
relative weight in the market for credit of 34%) an increase in capital was required. 
Two groups were able to cover these requirements by their own means and the 
remaining eight were able to count on public aid provided by the FROB and financed 
through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), under the financial support 
programme for bank recapitalisation. Adding these contributions to those made in 
prior years by the FROB and the Deposit Guarantee Fund for Credit Institutions 
(FGDEC by its Spanish name), the total amount of public injections in the form of 
capital during the crisis totalled €61 billion. Additionally, through private measures, 
banks raised their capital by a further €53 billion, meaning that the recapitalisation 
drive undertaken through public and private means amounted to over 11% of GDP. 
Private measures included most notably burden-sharing exercises (involving hybrid 
instrument and subordinated debt-holders). 
… making it necessary to set 
in train a restructuring, 
recapitalisation and clean-up 
of the banking system and a 
reform of its regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks 
In early 2014, the European 
programme for bank 
recapitalisation was 
successfully concluded, 
having entailed far-reaching 
changes for the size and 
financial position of the 
system...
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There has also been a major reform of banking regulation and supervision with the ultimate 
aim of reducing the risk of future crises and of better protecting taxpayers and the economy 
from their potential consequences. A new bank crisis management and resolution 
framework has thus been established. The resulting arrangements provide for more flexible 
and nimble intervention by the Banco de España, they define the competencies of the 
FROB and the FGDEC, and they broaden the range of tools available at all stages of the 
crisis. The legal framework for savings banks has also been reformed, as it was revealed 
by the crisis to have certain key shortcomings, and stricter capital requirements have been 
imposed on them, setting for 2013 and 2014 a minimum level of core capital of 9%, above 
the minimum threshold laid down by European capital regulations, which have adapted 
Basel III. The reform also includes stricter requirements for reporting on exposure to the 
real estate sector and on refinancing operations, so as to increase the degree of banking 
transparency. Finally, supervisory procedures have been reviewed and reformed, with a 
series of organisational changes being introduced. 
The ongoing exit by FROB (and by FGDEC) from the capital of the State-supported banks 
also progressed during 2013 and has continued in 2014 to date. These two official funds 
have now ceased to be stakeholders in Banco de Valencia, Banco Gallego and NCG, and 
7.5% of the capital of Bankia was also sold to institutional investors – non-residents in the 
main – early this year. The sale of shares still in public hands is, in any event, one of the 
challenges that will need addressing. 
Likewise, the start-up of the Banking Union in Europe and the subsequent integration of 
banks and of the national supervisory authority into the SSM and the SRM poses 
organisational challenges not only for Spanish banks – and for the Banco de España itself 
– but also for all Eurosystem banks. This is the case too for the comprehensive assessment 
to which European banks as a whole are being subjected and which includes a new stress 
test, which the ECB is conducting in collaboration with the European Banking Authority 
and with the participation of the national supervisory authorities. 
Finally, the Spanish economy’s short- and medium-term growth outlook makes for a 
complex scenario for banks, which will be obliged to gain in efficiency and competitiveness 
in a setting in which progress towards the Banking Union may well be expected to heighten 
the degree of competition within the area. Here, too, banks will have to continue reinforcing 
their capital in response to the greater demands of regulators and investors. 
In conjunction with the easing of tensions and European markets, headway in the 
adjustment of the Spanish economy favourably influenced investors’ confidence and 
translated into substantial improvements in financing conditions in Spain for credit 
institutions, for general government and, though comparatively to a lesser degree, for 
households and firms. The costs of European wholesale market funds, on which the 
Treasury, banks and major national corporations draw, fell. So too, though more moderately 
and in the final stretch of the year, did funds from bank loans. In terms of amounts, the 
decline in private-sector financing slowed and signs were detected of the restoring of 
financial flows towards companies that are in a sound position and which, therefore, are 
better placed to efficiently use such funds. Along these same lines, three of the main rating 
agencies upgraded Spanish sovereign debt in the opening months of 2014. That said, euro 
area financial market fragmentation has not yet been eliminated, whereby these conditions 
continue to be overly strict for the strongly accommodating stance of the single monetary 
policy and for the specific circumstances of the Spanish economy’s incipient recovery. 
… and reforms of its 
regulatory and supervisory 
framework
Reducing the State ownership 
share in the system, the 
completion of the Banking 
Union and the macroeconomic 
outlook nonetheless pose new 
challenges for the sector
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The pick-up in investor confidence is also visible in the Spanish economy’s external 
funding flows (see Chart 1.9). Leaving aside the compensatory role the Banco de España 
balance sheet plays in this respect, the figures from the balance of payments financial 
account show how, following the outflow of funds totalling over €174 billion in 2012, 
there was a net inflow of funds of almost €88 billion in 2013. Net non-resident portfolio 
investment increased by almost €44 billion last year, compared with the contraction of 
over €55 billion observed a year earlier. However, these positive movements in terms of 
flows should not mask the fact that the Spanish economy’s net debtor position vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world remains excessively high compared with peer countries and is a 
factor of vulnerability.
The adjustment of the International Investment Position will involve sustaining our positive 
trade balance with the rest of the world, as reflected by the figure recorded in 2013 for the 
nation’s net lending (equivalent to 1.5% of GDP), the first time a positive figure has been 
posted since 1997. The turnaround was accompanied by a large-scale readjustment in the 
balances of the different institutional sectors. With the crisis, households and non-financial 
corporations have shown strong increases in their lending capacity, while general government 
borrowing needs have likewise grown substantially. From this sectoral perspective, the 
continuity of the adjustments under way should clearly also translate into an improved 
contribution of the general government sector to the economy’s overall balance. 
In this respect, there was also progress in correcting private-sector overindebtedness in 
2013, although the adjustment is, in comparative terms, proving somewhat slower. Chapter 2 
in this Report is dedicated exclusively to the Spanish economy’s debt and, in this 
connection, it offers a detailed analysis of how the adjustment is being made and of the 
main challenges it poses. As is explained, both the cyclical position of our economy and 
past experience suggests that credit must continue on the path of adjustment, but 
increasingly more moderately so, until the recovery firms and provides for a more dynamic 
increase in household and corporate income. Consequently, the main challenge in the 
short term is how to square credit containment at the aggregate level with a shift in the mix 
of inflows of fresh funds, with this shift enabling such flows to be allocated to those uses 
with a more positive impact on growth and employment. While the evidence available 
External funding flows picked 
up, but will have to continue to 
do so sustainedly in order to 
redress the high debt position 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
The adjustment of private-
sector overindebtedness must 
also continue 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Excluding the Banco de España.
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SOURCES: INE, IGAE, AMECO and Banco de España.
a Spanish National Accounts data, base year 2008.
b Volume indices. Rate of change.
c Rate of change, except the unemployment rate, which is a level.
d Employment rate (16-64).
e Levels as a percentage of GDP.
f Annual average levels for the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index, interest rates and exchange rates, and rates of change for finanancial assets and liabilities.
g 1999 Q1 = 100.
h 1999 Q1 = 100. Measured with unit labour costs.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Demand and output (b)
    GDP 0.9 -3.8 -0.2 0.1 -1.6 -1.2
    Private consumption -0.6 -3.7 0.2 -1.2 -2.8 -2.1
    Government consumption 5.9 3.7 1.5 -0.5 -4.8 -2.3
    Gross capital formation -4.2 -18.3 -4.2 -5.6 -6.9 -5.2
    Equipment investment -2.9 -23.9 4.3 5.3 -3.9 2.2
    Construction investment -5.8 -16.6 -9.9 -10.8 -9.7 -9.6
    Housing -9.1 -20.4 -11.4 -12.5 -8.7 -8.0
    Other construction -1.6 -12.2 -8.4 -9.2 -10.6 -10.9
    Exports of goods and services -1.0 -10.0 11.7 7.6 2.1 4.9
    Imports of goods and services -5.2 -17.2 9.3 -0.1 -5.7 0.4
    Contribution of national demand to GDP growth -0.6 -6.7 -0.6 -2.1 -4.1 -2.7
    Contribution of net external demand to GDP growth 1.5 2.9 0.4 2.1 2.5 1.5
    Total employment -0.2 -6.2 -2.3 -2.2 -4.8 -3.4
    Employment rate (d) 65.4 60.8 59.7 58.8 56.5 55.6
    Unemployment rate 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1
    Compensation per employee 6.9 4.2 0.4 1.3 0.2 0.7
    Apparent labour productivity 1.1 2.5 2.2 2.3 3.3 2.3
    Unit labour costs 5.7 1.6 -1.7 -1.0 -3.0 -1.6
    GDP deflator 2.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6
    Consumer price index (12-month % change) 1.4 0.8 3.0 2.4 2.9 0.3
    Consumer price index (annual average) 4.1 -0.3 1.8 3.2 2.4 1.4
    Consumer price differential with the euro area (HICP) 0.9 -0.5 0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.2
    Resident sectors: domestic net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) -9.2 -4.4 -3.8 -3.5 -0.6 1.5
        General government -4.5 -11.1 -9.6 -9.6 -10.6 -7.1
            General government (excluding aid to financial institutions) -4.5 -11.1 -9.6 -9.1 -6.8 -6.6
        Households and NPISHs 1.2 6.3 4.2 3.7 2.4 2.5
        Companies -5.9 0.4 1.6 2.3 7.5 6.1
            Financial institutions 1.8 1.3 0.9 1.9 6.4 1.8
            Non-financial corporations -7.7 -0.9 0.7 0.3 1.1 4.3
    Net international investment position -79.3 -93.8 -89.1 -91.4 -92.7 -98.2
    General government gross debt 40.2 54.0 61.7 70.5 86.0 93.9
    ECB minimum bid rate on MROs 3.9 1.2 1.0 1.3 0.9 0.5
    Ten-year government bond yield 4.4 4.0 4.2 5.4 5.8 4.6
    Synthetic bank lending rate 6.2 3.8 3.3 4.1 4.1 4.1
    Madrid Stock Exchange General Index (Dec 1985 = 100) 1,278.3 1,042.4 1,076.5 971.8 767.5 879.8
    Dollar/euro exchange rate 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3
    Nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (g) 103.3 103.5 101.9 101.8 100.4 101.7
    Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (h) 119.0 116.2 113.0 110.6 103.8 102.1
    Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro area (h) 114.9 111.8 110.4 108.4 103.1 99.9
    Households: total financing 4.4 -0.3 0.2 -2.4 -3.8 -5.1
    Non-financial corporations: total financing 8.2 -1.4 0.7 -1.9 -6.1 -5.1
Monetary and financial indicators (f)
Employment, wages, costs and prices (c)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) and financial balance (e)
MAIN INDICATORS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a) TABLE 1.1 
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suggests this shift is already taking place, it would be worth considering potential means 
of speeding up and deepening the process.
The economy has emerged from the double-dip recession and is moving into economic 
growth territory. The gradual improvement in activity has been accompanied by the 
correction of the main imbalances built up during the previous upturn. However, 
anchoring the recovery faces major challenges related to the depth of the effects of the 
crisis. The level of unemployment and the debt of the resident sectors are possibly the 
most significant challenges, not only because of their scale but also because their 
absorption will foreseeably require considerable time. Against this backdrop, the pick-
up in domestic demand will come about at a more moderate pace than in previous 
episodes of recovery. 
The weighty legacy of the crisis will continue to bear down significantly on economic 
policy action, which must square the deleveraging of the public and private sectors 
(with the inevitable restrictiveness this entails) with the ongoing adjustment of relative 
costs and prices needed to further improve competitiveness and push through the 
reallocation of resources to sectors with higher growth potential in the new economic 
conditions. Achieving progress in both areas faces the added difficulty posed by the 
macroeconomic scenario that will prevail on the more immediate horizon, given the 
forecasts for the continuation of a prolonged period of low inflation and moderate 
productivity gains. 
The adjustments pending and the constraints high debt imposes mean that the leeway 
for applying expansionary macroeconomic policies is very limited. The stance of the 
single monetary policy is already exceptionally accommodating and the room to adopt 
further measures at the euro area level is limited. Of most relevance to the Spanish 
economy, however, despite the measures adopted, is the fragmentation persisting on 
euro area financial markets and preventing the proper transmission of monetary 
impulses to the economies, such as Spain’s, hardest hit by the crisis. Resolute action 
addressing the causes behind this fragmentation, beyond the strictly monetary realm, 
will contribute to the normalisation of financial conditions that recovery in the Spanish 
economy requires. 
Fiscal action, in turn, is constrained by the pressing need to ensure the sustainability of 
public finances as a key ingredient of the deleveraging of the economy. That is an 
unavoidable condition for sustaining confidence and external funding flows. 
The revision of the budgetary adjustment path in the summer of 2013 eased budgetary 
restrictiveness in the short run but shifted a significant portion of the fiscal drive needed to 
restore budgetary stability to the 2015-2016 period. According to estimates from the latest 
Updated Stability Programme, the fiscal drive that would be required to fulfil the target 
path set, proxied by the change in the primary structural balance, would be around 2.5 pp, 
which would be on top of the effort already made. This figure illustrates the fact that the 
achievement of the budgetary targets cannot hinge solely on an improvement in the 
cyclical situation. According to the same estimates, only strict fulfilment of the programmed 
objectives would enable the rising trajectory of the public debt/GDP ratio to be halted from 
2015, after having reached a ratio of 101.7% of GDP. 
In this highly complex setting, economic policy must maintain the reduction of the budget 
deficit by the amount mentioned as its priority objective. The design of a well-defined 
4  The legacy of the crisis 
and the role of Spanish 
economic policy 
The firming of the recovery 
also faces significant 
challenges related to the 
aftermath of the crisis 
The leeway for applying 
expansionary macroeconomic 
policies is very limited
Fiscal policy must keep as its 
primary objective the 
reduction of the deficit and the 
stabilisation and subsequent 
reduction in public debt 
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medium-term fiscal consolidation programme might contribute to anchoring expectations 
and to easing the way for the implementation of the measures needed to bring the budget 
deficit trajectory back towards more comfortable levels. 
The fiscal consolidation process should also be accompanied by the definition of a public 
spending and revenue structure more conducive to economic growth. In the case of public 
spending, an adjustment has been under way since 2012, involving certain healthcare and 
education spending-related measures, followed by the entry into force of the local 
government reform, the Law on Public Sector Rationalisation and other government reform 
measures. Seeing these reforms through is essential for ensuring a more efficient 
contribution by the public sector to economic activity, laying the foundations for achieving 
a more lasting adjustment in public spending and placing public finances in a better 
position to ensure their sustainability in the medium and long run. The depth and 
consistency of this process would benefit from being accompanied by an assessment and 
comprehensive review of overall general government public spending, in line with the 
recommendations of the European Council. 
There was further progress in 2013 towards the medium-term sustainability of pensions 
following the definition in December of the so-called sustainability factor, which had already 
been envisaged in the 2011 reform, and the introduction of the pension revaluation index. 
The sustainability factor, whose entry into force is envisaged for 2019, will enable life 
expectancy to be incorporated into the determination of initial pensions. In turn, the 
revaluation index replaced the automatic updating of this public spending component on 
the basis of past inflation with the new procedure that takes into account Social Security 
finances and which sets floors and ceilings for the revaluation amount (0.25% in the first 
instance, as was the case for 2014, and the CPI plus 0.5% in the second instance). The 
budgeting of pensions spending for 2014 (entailing a 0.25% revaluation) has already been 
made following this criterion. 
As regards public revenue, the government has announced the approval of a tax reform in 
the second half of this year with a view to its being operational in early 2015, in compliance 
with the commitments entered into at the European level. The aim of the reform is to 
redress the problems afflicting taxation in Spain, which came particularly to light during the 
crisis. First among the aspects to be reviewed is the existence of legal rates on the main 
taxes that are similar to or higher than the average for other European countries but which 
have less revenue-raising capacity, a fact that may be attributed to the wide range of tax 
benefits in place and, probably, to high tax evasion. And, secondly, a tax structure skewed 
towards indirect taxation and social security contributions, which is more harmful for 
employment and competitiveness. Importantly, the tax changes introduced must, in 
addition to improving the efficiency of the tax system, be fully compatible with and 
conducive to budgetary consolidation. 
Prior to adopting the reform, the Government entrusted a Committee of Experts with 
producing a report, which was released in March 2014. The report sets out avenues of 
reform which, overall, would tend to improve the efficiency of the tax system. Specifically, 
their proposal resides on the need to increase the weight of indirect taxation, which would 
allow reductions on an equivalent scale to be made in social security contributions and in 
the direct taxes raised on households and firms. It further proposes eliminating tax 
rebates, reductions and exemptions, greater neutrality among real and financial saving 
instruments, and the reduction of the relative tax incentives favouring debt that are 
currently in place. 
The composition of the fiscal 
adjustment can play a key role 
in improving growth potential 
through a more efficient fiscal 
system and expenditure 
structure 
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One of the prominent features of Spanish general government is the high degree of 
decentralisation. As a result, and as manifest over recent years, regional government 
conduct is crucial both for the success of the fiscal consolidation process and for the 
definition of a more efficient public revenue and expenditure structure. This is why the 
ongoing rationalisation of public spending requires the active collaboration of this tier of 
government. At the same time, the design of a public revenue framework commensurate 
with their spending responsibilities is crucial. In this respect, the reform of territorial 
government funding arrangements considered for the second half of 2014 must improve 
the link between expenditure management and the resources available to regional 
governments to finance such spending. 
Given the limited leeway available to demand-side policies, reforming the factor and 
product markets is the primary area in which economic policy can act to see through the 
adjustments, minimise their costs (see Box 1.2) and thus contribute effectively to restoring 
the economy’s productive potential. The scope of these reforms is directly related to long-
and, indeed, short-term growth capacity, since they can be influential in removing the 
obstacles hampering entrepreneurial initiative, productivity gains, the reallocation of 
resources across sectors and employment generation. All these aspects are, moreover, 
essential for increasing the economy’s resilience in the face of potential shocks in a global 
context marked by persistent and numerous factors of uncertainty. 
The reforms adopted have made for appreciable headway in the area of internal devaluation. 
The heightened cyclical sensitivity of prices is providing for a correction of the competitive 
lag that built up over the past expansionary cycle, while the greater flexibility of the labour 
market has been conducive to wage moderation. There has also been a change in the role 
played by past inflation in determining costs and incomes. This is a change of significance 
in adapting to the requirements of euro area membership, which has been boosted by 
several initiatives. 
Firstly, because of the latest agreement on collective bargaining entered into by the social 
agents in 2012, which recommended a new framework for defining wage indexation 
clauses geared to softening the impact on wages of increases in the inflation rate brought 
on by transitory shocks, such as that prompted by a temporary rise in fuel prices. Other 
measures have sought to reduce the degree of indexation in other markets; a case in point 
is the reform of the Law on Urban Rentals, which eliminates the mandatory indexation of 
rental contracts to the CPI. To this same end, the entry into force in the coming months of 
the Law on Deindexation, which will be applicable to contracts entered into in the public 
sector domain (and for certain public revenue items), will build on this change of behaviour. 
It will do so to the greatest effect if it also passes through to the private sector, where the 
application of the provisions of the law is not mandatory but provides the necessary 
instruments should this option be chosen. The upshot should be that price-setting falls 
into line with its supply- and demand-side fundamentals, allowing an improvement in the 
determinants of competitiveness and preventing the re-emergence of some of the 
imbalances that compounded the crisis in Spain. 
In terms of employment, the effect of the labour market reform began to be perceived 
initially in an easing of job destruction flows in 2012, despite the still-weak economic 
environment. Adding to this was an initial rise in job creation flows in the closing months 
of 2013 (which has continued to date this year), centred mainly on the services sectors 
and chiefly in temporary and part-time employment. Precisely in an attempt to influence 
labour market duality, incentives were established in 2013 to create jobs among groups 
The highly decentralised 
general government structure 
poses specific challenges that 
must be addressed 
Structural reforms have an 
essential role to play in 
speeding through the  
adjustment and raising long-
term growth capacity 
Far-reaching reforms have 
been undertaken on different 
fronts in recent years, and 
their effects are already 
discernible, particularly in 
respect of internal devaluation 
The effects in terms of job 
creation are more incipient 
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BOX 1.2THE ROLE OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF HIGH DEBT
In the current setting, there is scant headroom to boost 
aggregate demand by means of conventional monetary policy 
(interest rate cuts) and fiscal policy (countercyclical balances) 
instruments. Accordingly, one of the main economic policy 
options for reinvigorating activity is the application of structural 
reforms that make product and factor markets more efficient 
and competitive. 
In the long run, there are few doubts over the positive effects of 
these reforms: insofar as a market becomes more competitive, 
the volume of activity grows, prices fall and the opportunities for 
improving economic agents’ welfare increase. Through the 
expectations of the latter, who discount a greater future spending 
capacity, a portion of the durable benefits of the reforms normally 
materialise in the short run (the expectations channel). However, 
the moderation in prices typically prompted by structural reforms 
may give rise to increases in real interest rates and, therefore, to 
declines in household and corporate spending in the short run 
(the interest rate channel). Moreover, given debt whose nominal 
amount is predetermined, a moderation in prices prompts a 
higher real value of debt (the “Fisher effect” or the debt deflation 
channel1), with the subsequent restrictive effect on debtor 
agents’ budgets. 
The relative intensity of the foregoing channels – expectations, 
on one hand, and the interest rate and debt deflation, on the 
other – determines the sign of the short-term impact of the 
structural reforms. Some recent research has emphasised the 
fact that the lack of headroom to make nominal interest rate cuts 
may be pivotal in inclining the balance in favour of contractionary 
channels.2 This type of analysis would appear to point to the 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a All variables expressed as deviations from their initial state, except private-sector debt/GDP, which is in percentage points.
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1  See I. Fisher (1933), “The debt-deflation theory of great depressions», 
Econometrica vol. 1, pp. 337-357.
2  See, for example, G. Eggertsson, A. Ferrero and A. Raffo (2014), “Can 
structural reforms help Europe?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 
61, pp. 2-22.
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BOX  1.2THE ROLE OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF HIGH DEBT (cont’d)
advisability of postponing the reforms until their contractionary 
effects may be countered by expansionary macroeconomic 
policies.3
Nonetheless, most of the macroeconomic models used in the 
foregoing research are designed to analyse the fluctuations proper 
to a traditional economic cycle, rather than those arising from a 
deep-seated macrofinancial crisis such as the present one. In a 
recent paper, Andrés, Arce and Thomas (2014)4 develop a specially 
designed model to analyse the effect of structural reforms on an 
environment similar to that currently characterising the Spanish 
economy, namely one of slow leverage, owing to the presence of 
a high volume of long-dated debt, and of restricted access to 
financing.  Further, the model considers that the domestic 
economy is part of a monetary union that has no leeway to lower 
interest rates. Businesses and a portion of households take on 
debt using the value of their real estate assets as collateral; 
however, when the value of their assets falls below a specific 
threshold, the extension of fresh credit is interrupted and, in that 
case, debtors restrict themselves to repaying their outstanding 
debt according to the maturities stipulated in their debt contracts. 
The starting point is a baseline scenario that includes a persistent 
tightening of loan access conditions for households and firms, and 
that entails, in particular, a reduction in the loan-to-value ratios of 
the new loans granted to these agents. The blue lines in Panel 1 
show the response of the economy to this financial shock (the 
magnitudes of the simulations are merely illustrative of the 
qualitative behaviour of the model and should not be interpreted as 
realistic quantitative approximations). The slump in real estate 
prices and, therefore, in the value of the collateral means the flow 
of new credit shrinks sharply, which gives rise to a long and slow 
process of private deleveraging. The need for households and 
firms to generate saving to repay their debts and clean up their 
balance sheets leads them to reduce consumption and investment 
levels. In parallel, the trade balance improves thanks to the gains in 
competitiveness to which the disinflationary effect of the shock and 
the subsequent contraction in domestic demand gives rise. Yet this 
improvement does not suffice to prevent a prolonged decline in 
GDP. When the value of the assets of the households and firms 
applying for funds reaches the minimum threshold for satisfying 
loan access conditions, the flow of fresh credit re-starts. Thereafter, 
a virtuous circle takes hold, with a vigorous pick-up in asset prices, 
in credit and in agents’ spending capacity. As a result, consumption 
and investment, and GDP too, begin to recover. 
The unbroken red lines in Panel 1 show the responses of the main 
variables when structural reforms are adopted that involve 
increases in the degree of competition in the product and labour 
markets. These reforms induce a lasting reduction in business 
mark-ups and give rise to more moderate wages.5 In the long run, 
these measures have a clearly positive effect on GDP and 
employment; but they also relieve the adverse effects of 
deleveraging in the short and medium term. This is chiefly due to 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The panels show the differential effect of the structural reforms on GDP, i.e. the difference between the two lines in the top-left hand graphic in Panel 1, for different 
values of the elasticities of exports and imports to relative prices.
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3  Some theoretical developments pointing along these lines can be found 
in the following papers: G. Eggertsson, G. (2012), “Was the New Deal 
contractionary?”, American Economic Review, vol. 102, pp. 524-555; G. 
Eggertsson, and P. Krugman (2012), “Debt, deleveraging, and the 
liquidity trap: a Fisher-Minsky-Koo approach”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 127, pp. 1469-1513; and J. Galí, and T. Monacelli 
(2014), “Understanding the gains from wage flexibility: The exchange 
rate connection”, CEPR discussion paper 9806.
4  See J. Andrés, Ó. Arce and C. Thomas (2014), “Structural reforms in a debt 
overhang”, Documento de Trabajo del Banco de España (forthcoming).
5  Specifically, there is a reduction in price mark-ups (i.e. the difference 
between production prices and marginal production costs) and wage 
mark-ups (that between wages paid to workers and their reserve wages). 
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the better performance of investment. Specifically, anticipation of 
the beneficial effects of the reforms in the long run means that, in 
the short run already, households and firms increase their 
investment demand relative to the baseline scenario. This greater 
demand entails a lesser decline in real estate asset prices. That 
contributes to curtailing the severity of the decline in debtors’ 
financial worth and, therefore, helps them regain earlier the 
minimum threshold at which new credit may be granted. 
Combining with this positive effect on firms’ financial capacity is a 
contraction in these agents’ consumption which, in the context of 
this model, may be assimilated to smaller dividend payouts (and, 
therefore, a greater accumulation of retained earnings). 
In this way, the reforms bring forward the end of the deleveraging 
process and, therefore, of the recession, thus reinforcing the 
expectations channel. At the same time, since the flow of new credit 
slows substantially during the deleveraging phase, private spending 
decisions at the aggregate level are relatively insensitive to the 
increase in the real interest rate induced by the deflationary effect of 
the reforms. This leads to a loss of intensity in the interest rate 
channel. The combination of both effects – the reinforcement of the 
expectations channel and the weakening of the interest rate channel 
– results in a net positive effect of the reforms on activity and 
employment in the short run already, which prevails over the negative 
Fisher effect arising from a path of lower prices. In this respect, the 
presence of a high proportion of long-term debt – which is an 
essential factor in the current crisis, especially in the case of 
household mortgage debt – operates by substantially cushioning the 
short-term contractionary effect of the debt deflation channel.
One significant channel for the transmission of the effects of the 
reforms is that of foreign trade. As can be seen in Panel 1, the 
reforms do not bring about a significant effect on the trade balance 
in the short term. This apparent lack of effect encompasses two 
opposing forces: although the reforms bring about an additional 
lowering of the prices of domestic products, they also prompt an 
improvement in domestic demand. This behaviour of the external 
balance depends largely on the sensitivity of trade flows to the 
relative prices of domestic and foreign goods. The left-hand 
graphic of Panel 2 shows the differential effect of the reforms on 
GDP6 for two different calibrations of the elasticity of exports to 
relative prices: unit elasticity (the baseline value7), and a very low 
elasticity of 0.2. In this latter case, the effects of the reforms in the 
short run turn negative, owing to the insufficient positive 
contribution of exports. In the case of imports (right-hand graphic), 
reducing their price-elasticity also reduces the positive effect of 
the reforms, though not to the extent of changing the sign of this 
effect. This example illustrates, therefore, that a key condition if 
the reforms are to have beneficial effects in the short term is that 
the resulting gain in competitiveness should pass through with 
sufficient intensity to trade flows. 
BOX 1.2THE ROLE OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF HIGH DEBT (cont’d)
6  The differential effect of the reforms on GD Pis equivalent to the vertical 
distance between the two lines in the upper left-hand graphic of Panel 1.
7  The calibration of the unit elasticity of exports is based on estimates for 
Spain by C. García, E. Gordo, J. Martínez-Martín and P. Tello (2009), “Una 
actualización de las funciones de exportación e importación de la economía 
española”, Documentos Ocasionales, no. 0905, Banco de España.
with the highest unemployment rates (such as unskilled youths). Also, measures were 
taken to boost permanent hires, through the introduction of greater flexibility in part-time 
hiring arrangements or through the reduction, early this year, in the social security 
contributions payable in connection with new permanent jobs. This programme of 
incentives might provide a boost to permanent contracts this year; however, on the 
evidence available on the impact of this type of rebate, the effects on net employment are 
estimated to be more uncertain. 
Looking ahead to the coming quarters, it is expected that, as a result of the greater 
flexibility provided by the new labour market framework, employment will grow at rates 
which, while moderate, are high in relation to the increase in output, which will necessarily 
entail a declining path of productivity. Nonetheless, even under this relatively favourable 
job creation scenario, the unemployment rate will fall slowly, and the risks that its structural 
component will increase remain present (see Box 1.3). To prevent such risks materialising, 
there will be a need to ensure the continuity of gains in competitiveness and of the recovery 
in employment. Here, it will be necessary to monitor developments in collective bargaining 
arrangements and, especially, progress in wage flexibility, most particularly for smaller 
firms, along with the degree of decentralisation of such arrangements. To reduce the 
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The unemployment rate in the Spanish economy peaked in 2013 
Q1 (at 26.9% of the labour force), marking an increase of close to 
20 pp on the low recorded in 2007 Q3. Since then, unemployment 
has moved on a progressively declining path, dipping to 25.9% in 
2014 Q1. The latest macroeconomic projections of the Banco de 
España, released in March, point to the continuation of this 
trajectory over the remainder of 2014 and in 2015 in a setting in 
which the gradual recovery in activity is forecast to pass through 
intensely to job creation, assisted by ongoing wage moderation 
and its extension over the projection horizon. Notwithstanding, the 
unemployment rate in the Spanish economy is expected to hold at 
very high levels in comparative terms. 
There are different reasons why an initially cyclical increase in 
unemployment may become persistent, generating an increase in 
the structural component of unemployment through what is 
usually known as a hysteresis effect that hampers subsequent 
reductions in the unemployment rate, even in an economic upturn. 
Such hysteresis can be caused by various factors. Thus, enduring 
unemployment status over a prolonged period may ultimately 
exert permanent effects on the human capital of the unemployed, 
on their intensity of job search and on firms’ perception of their 
skills or background. These effects may be more significant in a 
context of sectoral reallocation of employment in which the skills 
demanded by firms differ from what the unemployed have to offer. 
One way of analysing the degree of persistence of unemployment 
consists of estimating the structural rate of joblessness, a concept 
that can be interpreted as the unemployment rate of the economy 
in the medium term, once the impact of cyclical factors is stripped 
BOX 1.3AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURAL COMPONENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT
SOURCES: EPA (INE) microdata and Banco de España.
a Percentage of total unemployed.
b Percentage of unemployed who find work in the following quarter.
c Mismatch between the distribution by educational attainment level (primary studies or less, first-phase secondary studies, higher secondary studies, 
vocational training and university studies) of the employed and the unemployed. Having regard to the sectoral dimension, three major sectors of activity are 
used (manufacturing, construction and services) and both the unemployed seeking their first job and the long-term unemployed, on whom no information 
on the sector of activity is available, are excluded.
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out. This structural component is, however, non-observable and 
estimating it is subject to high uncertainty as there are different 
methodological approaches that provide different results. 
Presented below are the results of the application of a methodology 
that involves estimating the disaggregation between the structural 
and cyclical components of unemployment using the Phillips 
curve approach.1 Specifically, a relationship is assumed between 
wage growth and deviations of unemployment from its structural 
component, i.e. the cyclical component of unemployment. Hence, 
if unemployment is below (above) its equilibrium or structural level, 
higher (lower) wage growth will tend to be observed, meaning that 
the structural unemployment rate, which under this approach is 
usually called the NAIRU, could be interpreted as that level of the 
rate that were compatible with stable inflation. 
The top left-hand hand graphic of Panel 1 shows the cumulative 
increase in the NAIRU since 2008 following the above-mentioned 
methodology. The high uncertainty constantly surrounding these 
estimates usually advises analysing medium-term trends rather 
than the discrete levels estimated.2 The results show that the 
Spanish economy’s structural unemployment rate would have 
increased by around 4 pp since the onset of the crisis.3 the 
estimates available for Spain by the OECD and the EC tend to 
offer a somewhat higher increase, with the NAIRU showing a more 
procyclical profile. 
This result would reflect the impact of hysteresis effects on the 
NAIRU. Thus, the average duration of unemployment episodes 
has risen from around 2.8 quarters to over 6.5 quarters in 2013, 
raising to 60.7% the proportion of the unemployed experiencing 
this status for more than a year. There has also been a most 
substantial increase in the percentage of those unemployed for a 
very long period, of over two years, to 38.9% of total unemployed 
(see the top right-hand graphic of Panel 1). This phenomenon is 
concentrated, moreover, in certain groups, such as employees 
over 50 years of age or the more unskilled unemployed, for which 
this percentage stood at around 50% at end-2013. 
Unemployment exit rates, which have fallen appreciably for all 
unemployment durations, have begun to rise slightly in 2013, at 
least for the unemployed with less duration in this situation (see 
the bottom left-hand graphic of Panel 1). Foreseeably, the incipient 
recovery will help entrench this improvement which, nonetheless, 
will probably be slower among the group with longer durations.4 
This diminished cyclicality of exits from unemployment once a 
large amount of time has been accumulated experiencing this 
status might limit the aggregate recovery of the unemployment 
exit rate in the face of a cyclical upturn. 
Unemployment persistence might also be related to the increase 
in the skills mismatch between labour supply and demand 
observed since the start of the crisis. In this connection, the 
bottom right-hand graphic of Panel 1 shows the changes in a 
skills mismatch index that seeks to measure the discrepancy 
between the breakdown by level of educational attainment of the 
employed and unemployed populations.5 In principle, it is 
expected that the bigger this mismatch is, the more difficult it will 
prove to reabsorb unemployment. The clear increase in the level 
of skills mismatch is observed during the crisis, caused by the 
concentration of job destruction among the lesser-skilled. If the 
sectoral dimension is taken into account, the pattern is similar 
and highlights how the acute job destruction in the construction 
industry, especially at the start of the crisis, prompted a 
considerable increase in the relative weight of the low-skilled 
unemployed. These results indicate that a reduction in 
unemployment will require the adaptation of unemployed 
workers’ skills to job requirements. 
In short, although a significant portion of the increase in 
unemployment since the start of the crisis is closely associated 
with the cyclical downturn, it cannot be ruled out that there has in 
parallel been an increase in the structural component of 
unemployment, which might hamper any reduction in 
unemployment in the near future. These difficulties appear to be 
particularly marked for specific groups, among whom very high 
unemployment durations are observed. The overall design of 
active and passive policies of support for the unemployed should 
focus on increasing the employability of these groups, analysing 
the links with the various social protection mechanisms and 
facilitating wage flexibility. 
BOX 1.3AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURAL COMPONENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT (cont’d)
1  See J. Gali (2011), “The Return of the Wage Phillips Curve”, Journal of 
European Economic Association, June, 9 (3), pp. 436-461.
2  See, for example, Estrada, Hernando and López Salido (2000), 
Measuring the NAIRU in the Spanish Economy, Documentos de Trabajo, 
no. 0009, Banco de España; or ECB (2012), Euro Area Labour Markets 
and the Crisis, Occasional Paper no. 138.
3  This increase is also similar to that estimated by Doménech (2013), 
“Potential Growth and Structural Unemployment in Spain, EMU and the 
US”, BBVA Research, mimeo, using an alternative methodology drawing 
on Okun’s Law. 
4  In particular, an analysis of the likelihood of exiting unemployment 
conducted for the 2005-2013 period, drawing on microdata on EPA 
flows, shows that this likelihood increases by 2.1 pp given a 1% 
improvement in GDP for the short-term unemployed, while for the 
longer-term unemployed the impact of an improvement in activity is only 
1.3 pp.
5  In particular, the distribution of the employed and unemployed population 
is used following five levels of educational attainment drawn from 
Spanish Labour Force Survey data. For further details see M. Izquierdo, 
S. Puente and P. Font (2013), “Evolución del desajuste educativo entre 
la oferta y la demanda de trabajo en España”, Boletín Económico, June, 
Banco de España.
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unemployment rate to a level comparable with that in other European countries will require 
an overhaul of active employment policies. Recent measures in this area have focused on 
moving forward, in coordination with the regional governments, by means of a new system 
of active policies that reinforces the link between the funds received and the effectiveness 
of the programmes undertaken in each region. Still under preparation is the strategy for the 
application of the so-called youth guarantee, which will offer training opportunities or job-
search support to unemployed youths. Both initiatives will be pursued during the current 
year, as envisaged in the National Reforms Programme (NRP) submitted by the 
Government to the European Commission on 30 April. 
If internal devaluation is to be successful, the reduction in labour costs must be 
accompanied by the containment of margins and efficiency gains in productive processes. 
In this respect, margins at the aggregate level during the crisis have been influenced, at 
least in part, by the effects arising from very tight financial conditions, as earlier indicated. 
Yet this behaviour also reveals the presence of barriers to competition in some industries 
that are hampering competitive devaluation and increasing the attendant costs; accordingly, 
it is vital to further reforms that increase competition in the product markets and boost the 
comparative quality of the goods and services produced.
Some of the reforms adopted in the past year are along these lines, and include most 
notably the respective Laws on Entrepreneurs, Market Unity Guarantee and Insolvency 
(the latter is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 2). The Law on Entrepreneurs launched 
a series of fiscal measures to facilitate small firms’ economic activities, including most 
notably the simplification and reduction of tax obligations. In turn, the aim of the market 
unity guarantee legislation is to eliminate potential inefficiencies arising as a result of 
different regional legislations for product marketing or services provision. In this same 
connection, various initiatives have been pursued to reduce the duration of legal procedures 
and thus cut into the high business costs stemming from the high number of lawsuits 
brought in Spain. 
Significant headway has thus been made in product market reform, but in some cases the 
effective implementation of these reforms faces major difficulties. In particular, the 
effectiveness of the precepts laid down in the market unity guarantee legislation will hinge 
critically on the degree of cooperation among the different tiers of government. Nor is 
implementation of the reform of the electricity industry and, more generally, of an energy 
policy geared to reducing Spain’s high dependence on imported energy proving free from 
difficulty. Lagging further behind in terms of implementation is the draft bill on professional 
services and associations, which proposes establishing a general regime of freedom of 
access and practice throughout Spanish territory in respect of services. The delays in the 
implementation process for this bill have so far prevented its final approval. 
Improvements in efficiency are also crucial for shoring up gains in competitiveness and, in 
particular, for increasing the economy’s growth potential in the medium term. Their role is 
all the more important in a setting in which the demographic projections available augur 
population declines that pose major challenges for long-term growth and the sustainability 
of public finances in the medium and long run. 
The above-mentioned liberalisation of product and services markets is a key ingredient of 
any strategy to raise productivity. Such measures should be accompanied by measures 
aimed at improving the economy’s human and productive capital. In this connection, the 
Organic Law for Improving Educational Quality amends various aspects of how the 
Product market reforms must 
be pushed through, providing 
for heightened competition 
and gains in efficiency 
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Spanish educational system is organised, though the challenges the economy faces mean 
this measure must be complemented with far-reaching reforms in university education and 
vocational training. The aforementioned NRP develops this latter aspect. 
In sum, fiscal consolidation and the deepening of the reform agenda are the fundamental 
economic policy instruments for building on the exit from the crisis and helping entrench 
incipient growth and job creation. Indeed, these are the only sound bases for tackling the 
necessary deleveraging of the economy and the lingering uncertainty in the international 
and European spheres.
